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Abstract
This paper analyzes the trade policy when country spread becomes more volatile
due to the possibility of sudden stops. Both analytical and numerical results show
that sudden stops have weaker output impact when the small open economy is more
open to trade; however, this does not imply the optimality of an open trade policy.
When the economy does not pay additional expenses to adjust its foreign debt, the
cost of sudden stops is decreasing in trade openness, which implies the optimality of
an open trade policy. In this case, external shocks may be welfare improving. The
economy will gain from counter-cyclical tariff rate policies. On the other hand, when
the economy has to pay additional expenses to adjust its foreign debt, a closed trade
policy is optimal. In this latter case, the nature of the policy and how the government
implements the policy matter. The results hold in economies with and without the
working capital constraint, and in both economies with GHH preferences and those
with Cobb-Douglas preferences.
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1 Introduction
We revisit the classical question of whether an open trade policy should be preferred to a
closed (protective) trade policy. The main motivation is the fact that external shocks (that
a small open economy faces) become more volatile, perhaps due to the possibility of sudden
stops [Mendoza (2001), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Loayza et al. (2007)]. On top of
that, country spread shocks are an important determinant of macroeconomic volatility of
emerging economies [Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006]. However, the
trade policy implication has not been examined using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models.
Second, the related empirical studies contain competing evidence about the relationship
between the output impact of external shocks and trade openness. For example, on the one
hand, Calvo et al. (2004) and Calvo and Talvi (2005) show that economies more open to
trade will adjust their output less when they are hit by sudden stops. On the other hand,
several studies show that greater trade openness increases output growth volatility [Rodrik
(1997), Easterly et al. (2001), and Loayza and Raddatz (2006)]. It is of interest to examine
whether they imply opposite recommendations with respect to trade policy.
We answer this question by evaluating the relationship between the welfare cost of sudden
stops and trade openness in a small open economy.1 In particular, we consider models with
and without financial frictions. We emphasize financial frictions for the following reasons.
The recent financial crisis shows an increasing role played by financial frictions in shaping
business cycles and some studies confirm the importance of financial frictions in explaining
some key variables such as trade-balance to GDP ratio [Garc´ıa et al. (2009)] and equity
returns [Jahan-Parvar et al. (2009)] in a small open economy.2 The conventional view is
that a closed trade policy may be preferred if there are market failures, externality, or some
political consideration [Bagwell and Staiger (1999) for theoretical analysis and Broda et al.
(2008) for empirical evidence]. It is thus of clear interest to examine the difference that
financial frictions may make with respect to trade policy.
Our results show that: (1) with the same external shocks, less open economies will
have larger induced endogenous responses of output; (2) the relationship between the cost
1Here costs refer to the welfare cost associated with the extra volatility of country spread arising from
the possibility of sudden stops; country spread refers to the premium the small open economy has to pay to
borrow in the international capital market, and trade openness is measured by the ratio of trade turnover
to GDP.
2There are more in the closed economy environment [Christiano et al. (2007), Faia and Monacelli (2007),
Gertler et al. (2007), and many others].
and trade openness depends on whether it is costly to adjust foreign debt; (3) exogenous
shocks may be welfare improving; and (4) we further undertake the sensitivity analysis which
indicates that these results are indeed robust and thus important.
The intuition behind the first result is that less open economies tend to have more volatile
capital. The reason is that the marginal cost of production, in terms of the price of the
imported intermediate input, is higher due to the higher tariff rate, which makes these
economies less open to trade. As a result, the demand for capital in a less open economy
is more elastic than that in a more open economy, and capital will adjust more in the less
open economy. When the external shocks become more volatile due to the possibility of
sudden stops, the induced additional volatility of capital is larger in a less open economy
for the same reason, as is that of output. This result provides a theoretical foundation for
the empirical finding of Calvo et al. (2004), even though we do not consider “dollarization”
while Calvo et al. (2004) do.
It turns out that the larger additional volatility of output does not necessarily lead to
a higher welfare cost. When the economy incurs no additional expenses in adjusting its
foreign debt, the cost of sudden stops decreases with trade openness. In this case, it is
optimal to make the trade door open wider when external shocks become more volatile.
By doing so, the marginal cost of production can be lowered (because the tariff rate is
lowered), and production becomes more efficient. This policy recommendation emphasizes
the connection, through the tariff rate, between trade openness and production efficiency.
This policy consideration is in line with Loayza et al. (2007), who argue that the self-
protection method as addressed in Ehrlich and Becker (1972) may later lead to large domestic
shocks.
However, if the economy has to pay additional expenses to obtain foreign debt, the larger
additional volatility of output usually results in a smaller cost in a less open economy, which
implies the optimality of a closed trade policy. The main reason is because the ability of
households to smooth consumption is compromised due to the debt adjustment costs. The
extent to which the ability to smooth consumption is weakened depends on the level of tariff
rate. Consequently, the cost of country spread volatility also depends on the level of tariff
rate. In this case, there may be two offsetting forces: one is the gain from the improvement
of production efficiency and the other one is the welfare lose when the ability to smooth
consumption is weakened due to financial friction. The numerical results show the later
force dominates, which leads to the optimality of a more closed trade policy.
The third result is that external shocks may be welfare improving. When the repre-
sentative household is a net borrower in the international capital market, its consumption
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increases at an accelerated rate as world interest rates decrease. Thus, the indirect utility
function becomes convex in interest rates. As a result, when interest rates are more volatile,
the representative household’s utility will be higher. This result extends the discussion about
the relationship between welfare and economic shocks. A branch of the literature has shown
that a risk averse household may prefer a volatile economy [Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000),
Bacchetta and Wincoop (2000), and Cho and Cooley (2005)].
This paper extends the discussion to evaluate the welfare effect of a time-varying tariff
rate policy. When the tariff rates are counter-cyclical and constitute a stationary process
around a fixed mean, they may improve welfare if there are no financial frictions. However,
if there are financial frictions, the nature of the policy and how the government implements
the policy matter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and sets up
its competitive equilibrium. Section 3 presents some qualitative results about the welfare
effect of country spread volatility. Section 4 carries out the numerical analysis. Section 5
discusses the case of a time-varying tariff rate policy. And Section 6 concludes.
2 The benchmark economy
The model used in this paper is based on Mendoza (1991) with three modifications: inter-
mediate imported inputs, a working capital constraint, and debt adjustment costs. There
are three types of agents, domestic households, firms, and the government. There are also
three real frictions: capital adjustment costs, debt adjustment costs, and a working capital
constraint.
The economy is driven by a joint process of the productivity shocks, the world interest
rate shocks, and the country spread shocks. The external shocks of interest in this paper
are country spread shocks, whose importance has been documented in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006). In this paper, the possibility of sudden stops is represented
by an increase in the volatility of country spread. This definition comes from the fact that
the possibility of sudden stops not only increases the average country spread that a small
open economy has to pay, but also makes the country spread more volatile [Mendoza (2001)].
In addition, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) argues that business cycles in emerging economies
are characterized by sudden stops and more volatile output, which contrast with those in
developed small open economies. This definition is different from others in the literature.
For example, Chari et al. (2005) define sudden stops as exogenous capital inflow reversal.
We focus on this model for several reasons. First, the model provides a simple framework
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that allows a role for trade policy. Second, the Mendoza (1991) model is widely used in the
small open economy literature. Third, recent studies emphasize the use of this benchmark
economy in explaining countercyclical real interest rates [Neumeyer and Perri (2005)], sta-
tionary trade-balance to GDP ratio [Garc´ıa et al. (2009)], and equity returns [Jahan-Parvar
et al. (2009)].
2.1 The representative household
The representative household chooses hours and consumption to maximize expected lifetime
utility:
max
{ct,ht}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
θtU(ct, ht),
where E0 denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information avail-
able at time 0. The variables θt, ct, and ht denote, respectively, the subjective discount
factor from period t to period 0, consumption, and hours.
In this paper, we consider two types of preferences: GHH utility in the benchmark
economy, and Cobb-Douglas utility as a robustness check.3 The momentum utility function
for GHH utility and the subjective discount factor take the following functional forms
U(ct, ht) =
[
(ct − hωt /ω)1−γ − 1
]
/ (1− γ) , (2.1)
θt+1 = β(c˜t, h˜t)θt, t ≥ 0, θ0 = 1, (2.2)
β(ct, ht) = (1 + ct − hωt /ω)−β1 . (2.3)
The function β represents the subjective discount factor between period t and period t +
1. The variables c˜t and h˜t denote the cross-sectional averages of consumption and hours,
respectively. They are taken as given by individual households.
The use of the endogenous subjective discount factor is one way to assure stationary
behavior of consumption in the small open economy [Mendoza (1991), Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2003), and Mulraine (2004)]. As long as β1 < γ, this preference guarantees a unique
limiting distribution of state variables; that the stationary cardinal utility is suitable for
dynamic programming, and that the consumption good in every period is a normal good
[Mendoza (1991)].
3For clarity, we discuss the Cobb-Douglas utility in a separate section.
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The representative household receives the profit, the capital rent, the labor income, and
income from intermediate input sale to firms.4 The household’s period budget constraint is
given by:
dt + rtkt + wtht + r
m
t mt + Γt ≥ Rt−1dt−1 + ct + it + (1 + τ)mt + Φ(kt+1 − kt) + Ψ(dt),
(2.4)
where choices it, dt, and mt denote investment, foreign debt position, and the imported
intermediate input, respectively.5 rt, wt, and r
m
t denote the rate of return on capital, the
wage rate, and the firm-paid price of the imported intermediate input. τ denotes the tariff
rate levied on the imported intermediate input. Γt denotes the government transfer.
The economy has five state variables. Eq. (2.4) is related to four of them: Rus, CR,
dt−1, and kt, which denote, respectively, world interest rates, country spread, debt position
from the last period, and physical capital today. In addition, Rt−1 denotes the country risk
free rate faced by individual households. The country interest rate, R, is the product of the
world interest rate, Rus, and the country spread, CR. The law of motion of capital is given
by:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it, (2.5)
which is standard. Φ(kt+1 − kt) denotes the capital adjustment cost where Φ(kt+1 − kt) =
φ(kt+1 − kt)2/2 for computational simplicity. The cost is included because of its empiri-
cal relevance. Once we introduce the cost, the model can match the behavior of invest-
ment. Financial frictions are represented by Ψ(dt), debt adjustment costs. Here Ψ(dt) =
ψ [exp(dt − d)− 1] and d denotes the non-stochastic steady state of net foreign debt. The
inclusion of debt adjustment costs is another way to assure the stationary behavior of debt
[Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)]. This allows us to discuss other different preferences
when we set the one-period subjective discount factor constant, and this directly follows the
exercise in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
4Even though households receive profit from firms, we do not include profit in the budget constraint
because it is well known that the profit is zero with the assumed constant return to scale technology.
5The price of mt is normalized to unity. By assuming the relative price of mt to be unity, we close the
door through which the dynamics of terms of trade can affect the economy here.
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The representative household is subject to the non-Ponzi-game condition
lim
j→∞
Et
dt+j+1∏j
s=0Rt+s
≥ 0. (2.6)
The condition rules out the possibility that the representative household borrows to finance
its consumption without limit.
Let βtµt and β
tqt be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5). The
optimality conditions include the non-Ponzi game condition (2.6), period budget constraints
holding with equality (2.4), the law of motion of capital (2.5), and the first order conditions
as follows:
ct : 0 = µt − uct, (2.7)
ht : 0 = wt + uht/uct, (2.8)
dt : 0 = µt [1−Ψ′(dt)]− θt+1/θt ×RtEtµt+1, (2.9)
mt : 0 = 1 + τ − rmt , (2.10)
it : 0 = 1− qt, (2.11)
kt+1 : 0 = µt (1 + φ(kt+1 − kt))− (2.12)
θt+1/θt × Etµt+1 [1− δ + φ(kt+2 − kt+1) + rt+1] .
All the first order conditions have their usual interpretations.
2.2 The firms
There are many identical final-good production firms. They (100% owned by domestic
households) produce the final good by hiring labor, renting capital, and buying the im-
ported intermediate input from households. Firms use constant return to scale technology
to produce:
yt = ztk
αk
t h
αh
t m
αm
t ,
where 0 < αk < 1, 0 < αh < 1, 0 < αm < 1, and αk + αh + αm = 1. The variables yt, zt, kt,
ht, and mt denote the output of the final good, the total productivity factor, capital, hours
and the intermediate input, respectively. In this economy, the total productivity factor is
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assumed to follow the process6
ln(zt+1) = ρ ln(zt) + ε
z
t+1, ε
z
t+1 ∼ IIND(0, σ2z), (2.13)
where ρ denotes the first order serial autocorrelation of z and 0 < ρ < 1, εzt+1 denotes
the technology shocks, IIND denotes identical and independent normal distribution, and σ2z
denotes the variance of technology shocks.
Firms are subject to a working capital constraint, so that output will drop in the presence
of a positive country spread shock [Chari et al (2005)]. In addition, Neumeyer and Perri
(2005) show that a working capital constraint helps amplify the effect of fundamental shocks
on business cycles. For simplicity, we adapt the same constraint as that in Uribe and Yue
(2006). In particular, the working capital constraint takes the following form
WKt ≥ ϕwtht, (2.14)
where the variable WKt denotes the amount of working capital. The parameter ϕ ≥ 0
denotes the number of quarter wage bills the representative firm needs to pay. If ϕ = 0,
the working capital constraint is dropped from the economy. The representative firm’s debt
position evolves as
dft = Rt−1d
f
t−1 − yt + wtht + rtkt + rmt mt + pit −WKt−1 +WKt,
where dft denotes the debt position of the firms. Defining the net liability of the representative
firm as at = Rtd
f
t −WKt, we can rewrite the budget constraint of the representative firm as
at
Rt
= at−1 − yt + wtht + rtkt + rmt mt + pit +
(
Rt − 1
Rt
)
WKt. (2.15)
Since the representative firm is owned by the representative household, the objective function
of firms is defined by
max E0
∞∑
t=0
θt
µt
µ0
pit,
where µt denotes the marginal wealth utility of the representative household. The objective
function is the same as that in Uribe and Yue (2006). The representative firm is also subject
6The structural parameters, ρ and σz, are calibrated in the Section 4.2.
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to the following non Ponzi-game constraint
lim
j→∞
Et
at+j
pijs=0Rt+s
≤ 0. (2.16)
Since firms do not make the investment decision, their problem reduces to a static problem
to maximize its period profit by choosing kt, ht, and mt, and taking zt, rt, wt, and r
m
t as
given. The first order conditions for firms are standard:
kt : rt = αkztk
αk−1
t h
αh
t m
αm
t , (2.17)
ht : wt [1 + ϕ (Rt − 1) /Rt] = αhztkαkt hαh−1t mαmt , (2.18)
mt : r
m
t = αmztk
αk
t h
αh
t m
αm−1
t . (2.19)
These optimality conditions have their usual interpretations. In addition, since any process
at that satisfies Eqs. (2.15) and (2.16) will be optimal for the representative firm, we follow
Uribe and Yue (2006) and set at at 0.
2.3 The government
The government collects a stream of tariff tax income, denoted by τmt. These incomes are
rebated back to the domestic households in a lump sum tax, Γt. The government’s sequential
budget constraint is then given by
τmt = Γt, t ≥ 0. (2.20)
We do not consider the government expenditure shocks in order to simplify the discussion.
2.4 Competitive equilibrium
In equilibrium, the capital market, the labor market, and the intermediate input market all
clear. The aggregates equal to the counterparts of the representative household’s because
households are assumed to be identical:
c˜t = ct; (2.21)
h˜t = ht. (2.22)
Proposition 2.1 The competitive equilibrium is defined as a sequence of real allocations {ct,
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ht, dt, mt, it, kt+1, c˜t, h˜t, Πt, Γt}∞t=0, and prices {µt, qt, rt, wt, rmt }∞t=0, given d−1, k0, the
law of motion of the interest rate (4.3), and the law of motion of the total productivity factor
(2.13), satisfying the conditions (2.4) with equality, (2.5), (2.6)-(2.12), and (2.17)-(2.22).
3 Qualitative analysis
In general, there is no analytical solution to this dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model, and hence policy analysis must depend on numerical results. The GHH utility func-
tion with the endogenous discount factor, however, allows us to analyze some important
qualitative results of this economy without resorting to numerical calculation. Hence, we
discuss the role of the tariff rate, output impact of country spread shocks, and welfare effect
of country spread shocks before we proceed to the numerical analysis.
3.1 The role of the tariff rate
In the literature about tariff, a country that has market power on imported goods may gain
from protection by setting tariffs on its imports [Bagwell and Staiger (1999) for theoretical
analysis and Broda et al. (2008) for empirical evidence]. However, the role of the tariff
rate in this paper is different because there is neither any externality nor market failure in
our economy. We impose a tariff on the intermediate imported inputs for the following two
reasons.
First, the introduction of the tariff rate serves the purpose of controlling the trade open-
ness of the economy. Formally, it is straightforward to show that
TO =
Exports + Imports
y −m =
TB + 2m
y −m = stb +
2
(1 + τ)/αm − 1 , (3.1)
where TO denotes trade openness, TB denotes trade balance, y denotes output, m denotes
the intermediate imported inputs, stb denotes the trade-balance to GDP ratio, τ denotes the
tariff rate, and αm is a structural parameter. The value added (or GDP) to this small open
economy is given y −m. Equation (3.1) makes it clear that trade openness is decreasing in
the tariff rate. The government can adjust the trade openness by changing the value of the
tariff rate.
Second, the imposition of a tariff does not cause loss in the long-run welfare of households
with GHH utility augmented by the endogenous subjective discount factor. In other words,
the non-stochastic steady state of period utility is independent of the tariff rate. Formally,
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we have the following non-stochastic steady state of lifetime utility function
V =
[
(c− hω/ω)1−γ − 1] /(1− γ)
1− β(c, h) =
{
[log(R)/β1 − 1]1−γ − 1
}
/(1− γ)
1− 1/R , (3.2)
where β(c, h) denotes the non-stochastic steady state one-period endogenous subjective dis-
count factor. ω, γ, and β1 are structural parameters and R is the non-stochastic steady state
of country interest rate. All of them are fixed when we analyze the welfare cost of sudden
stops. The last equality comes from the following Euler equation in the non-stochastic steady
state:
β(c, h)R = (1 + c− hω/ω)−β1 R = 1.
It is thus clear from Eq. (3.2) that the non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility is indepen-
dent of tariff rates (trade openness). In addition, any change of the non-stochastic steady
state lifetime utility due to the change in R is independent of the tariff rate (trade openness).
This property justifies our approach of focusing on the cost associated with the volatility
of country spread. In principle, the possibility of sudden stops increases not only the volatility
of country spread but also the level of country spread. Thus, the cost associated with
the possibility of sudden stops could be decomposed into two parts: the cost associated
with the change of volatility of country spread (cost of second order importance), and the
cost associated with the change of level of country spread (cost of first order importance).
However, in our economy, the change of non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility due to
the change in the level of country spread is independent of trade openness. Thus, when
we discuss the cost associated with the possibility of sudden stop, we focus on the cost of
second order importance because the cost of first order importance is the same across trade
openness when we use the augmented GHH preferences.
We plot the non-stochastic steady states of some key variables against the tariff rate in
Fig. 1. It is clear that trade openness is decreasing in the tariff rate while the lifetime utility
is constant across tariff rates. The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 In a small open economy, if the preferences are given by Eq. (2.1), the
endogenous subjective discount factor is given by Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3), and the competitive
equilibrium is given by Proposition 2.1, then the non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility
is independent of the tariff rate and the trade openness is decreasing in the tariff rate.
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3.2 Why the response of output is larger in a less open economy?
Without debt adjustment costs, we find (as shown in Section 4.4) that the cost (of extra
volatility of country spread) is decreasing in trade openness, which implies that an open
trade policy should be preferred. To understand this result, it is crucial to understand why
the less open economy becomes more volatile with the given external shocks.
The higher volatility of output in a less open economy is mainly because capital is more
volatile. The reason is that the marginal cost of production, in terms of the price of the
imported intermediate input, is higher due to the higher tariff rate. Thus, the demand for
capital in a less open economy is more elastic than that in a more open economy. This
difference in demand for capital brings in the difference in the volatilities of capital. For any
realized external shock, capital in the equilibrium will adjust more in a less open economy.
This is because the demand curve is flatter in a less open economy while the supply curve of
capital is the same. When the external shocks become more volatile due to the possibility
of sudden stops, the additional volatility on capital is larger in a less open economy for the
same reason. With the typical calibration of a standard small open economy, this larger
additional volatility of capital is transformed into a higher cost, when the economy has to
pay additional expenses to adjust its foreign debt.
Formally, given the model specification, the rate of return on capital is inversely related
to the tariff rate. To see this relationship, we derive the following equation about the rate
of return on capital from Eqs. (2.8), (2.10), (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19):
rt = αk
(
αh
Xt
)(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1( αm
1 + τ
)αm$1(αh+ωαm)+1
z$1ωt k
−(ω−1)αh$1
t , (3.3)
where $1 = 1/ (ω − αh − ωαm) > 0. Xt = [1 + ϕ (Rt − 1) /Rt] and Xt = 1 when there is no
working capital constraint.
It is clear from Eq. (3.3) that the negative relationship holds: for a given state of capital
stock and productivity, the rate of return on capital is inversely related to the tariff rate.
Or, the rate is positively related to trade openness.
To see how this relationship leads to more volatile capital in a less open economy, we
start with a simple case by assuming no adjustment costs, no working capital constraint,
and constant productivity. With those assumptions, we combine (2.9) and (2.12) and obtain
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the following:
Rt =
Etµt+1 (1− δ + rt+1)
Etµt+1
= 1− δ + αk (αh)(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1
(
αm
1 + τ
)αm$1(αh+ωαm)+1
k
−(ω−1)αh$1
t+1 .
The last equality comes from the fact that kt+1 is known at the time t; and productivity is
assumed to be constant, so rt+1 is known at the time t.
When there is a positive country spread shock, i.e., Rt goes up, the representative house-
hold will accumulate less capital for the next period, ∆kt+1 < 0. However, the representative
household in the less open economy will accumulate even less capital:
∆kt+1(high tariff) < ∆kt+1(low tariff) < 0.
This result holds because the less open economy has to reduce more capital to equalize
the rate of return on bond and that on capital, i.e., the demand for capital in less open
economies is more elastic. When there is a negative country spread shock, i.e., Rt goes down,
the representative household will accumulate more capital for the next period, ∆kt+1 > 0.
However, the representative household in the less open economy will accumulate even more
capital for the same reason. Since for any country spread shock, the less open economy has
a bigger adjustment in capital, hence capital is more volatile.
This negative relationship holds even if we bring back the working capital constraint.
To see this, we further assume that Rt follows a perfect foresight process, therefore Xt+1 is
known in period t and we obtain the following
(Rt + δ − 1) (Xt+1)(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1
αk (αh)
(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm)−1 =
(
αm
1 + τ
)αm$1(αh+ωαm)+1
k
−(ω−1)αh$1
t+1 .
It is clear that for any change happens to the left-hand side of the above equation, capital
adjusts to a greater extent in a less open economy (as in the previous case). The difference is
that capital may increase, instead of decrease, when Rt increases. This is because when Rt
goes up, it is usually true that Rt+1 will go up and this will increase Xt+1 as well. However,
if αm is sufficiently large, the term (Xt+1)
(1−αm)$1(αh+ωαm) may go down and bring down
the left-hand side of the equation. As a result, kt+1 may increase and move in the same
direction as Rt. One thing worth mentioning is that this possible comove of capital and
interest rate is not in line with empirical facts. Moreover, it has not occurred in all the
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simulations conducted in the numerical experiments.
Proposition 3.2 In a small open economy solely driven by country spread shocks, if there
are no capital and debt adjustment costs, productivity is constant, and the competitive equi-
librium is given by Proposition 2.1, then capital is more volatile in a less open economy.
There is no close-form answer to whether capital is more volatile in a less open economy
when we include productivity shocks, country spread shocks, and related adjustment costs.
We answer that question and the policy implication with numerical results in Section 4.3.
We find that, more volatile capital in a less open economy, shows up after we introduce those
adjustment costs, productivity shocks, and even with different preferences. The implication
for trade policy in economies without debt adjustment costs, however, is different from that
in economies with debt adjustment costs; see Section 4.4).
3.3 Why country spread shocks may be welfare improving?
One result of this paper is that country spread shocks may enhance utility. This result
seems counter-intuitive. To understand why the risk averse household may like economic
uncertainty associated with country spread, we use the following simple two-period model to
illustrate the welfare effect of country spread shocks. Suppose the representative household
in a small open economy lives for two periods: period 1 and period 2. It has the following
endowment flows: y1 = 0 in period 1, and y2 in the period 2. This endowment distribution
makes sure that the household will be a borrower in period 1. In period 1, the household
solves a perfect foresight problem. Formally, the household chooses consumption and the
borrowing and lending position to maximize his utility function:
V = log(c1) + log(c2).
The subjective discount factor is assumed to be 1 in order to simplify the discussion. His
period budget constraints are c1 + b1 = 0 and c2 = Rb1 + y2. It can be shown that the
solutions are c1 = y2/ (2R) and c2 = y2/2. The variables c1, c2, b1, and R denote consumption
in period 1, consumption in period 2, the borrowing and lending position, and the interest
rate, respectively.
Ex ante, the value of R is unknown. Thus, the expected indirect utility is given by
EV = 2 log (y2/2)− E log(R). (3.4)
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Equation (3.4) clearly shows that the expected utility is convex in R. This implies that when
R becomes more volatile, the EV will be higher. The intuition is: When the representative
household is a net borrower in the international capital market, its consumption will increase
at an accelerated rate as country spread decreases. As a result, when the country spread is
more volatile, the ex ante expected indirect utility is higher.
A relevant case is where the next period output is a decreasing function of today’s interest
rate. Suppose Yt+1 = R
−1/Λ
t , where Λ > 0, then the choices of consumption are c1 =
R
−1−1/Λ
1 /2 and c2 = R
−1/Λ
1 /2. The ex ante expected indirect utility of the household is given
by:
EV = − (1 + 2/Λ)E logR1 − 2 log 2. (3.5)
Compared to (3.4), it is clear that endogenizing output will re-enforce the positive welfare
effect of interest rate volatility.
An example in which country spread shocks are detrimental to welfare can be the case
in which the small open economy is a net lender in the international capital market. To see
this, assume y1 > 0 and y2 = 0 instead of y1 = 0 and y2 > 0 as in the above example. In
this case, the representative household is a net lender in the international capital market. It
is straightforward to show that, ex ante, we have
EV = 2 log (y1/2) + E log(R).
The expected indirect utility is concave in R and it decreases when the volatility of country
spread increases.7
Combining the two examples together, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 In a two-period small open economy, country spread shocks are welfare
improving if the representative household does not have endowment income today. Coun-
try spread shocks have adverse welfare effects if the representative household does not have
endowment income tomorrow.
Since the unconditional welfare may increase in the country spread volatility, it is not
a surprise to find out that country spread shocks may actually be welfare improving. In
Section 4.4, we show with the numerical analysis that whether the cost in the benchmark
economy is positive or negative largely depends on the net borrowing and lending position
7Ericson and Liu (2009) discuss the welfare effect of interest rate shocks in more detail.
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of this small open economy and debt adjustment costs. If, on the other hand, the small open
economy is a net borrower in the international capital market or there are costs in adjusting
foreign debt, then the increase of volatility of country spread may decrease the welfare of
the representative household.
4 Quantitative analysis
We apply the second order perturbation method discussed in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004) to obtain the numerical solution to the competitive equilibrium defined in Proposition
2.1. The perturbation method has been widely used in the literature.8 We use the second
order approximation algorithm because the first order approximation method could not
differentiate welfare in two different economies with the same non-stochastic steady state
but different volatilities. Formally, the first order approximation of utility is given by:
EUt = U + Ux(Ext − x) + Uσσ,
where E denotes the mathematical unconditional expectation operator. A variable without
time-subscript denotes its non-stochastic steady state. The vector x denotes the logarithm
of state variables. The parameter σ controls the volatility of the cycles. The row vector
Ux denotes the first order derivative of utility with respect to x. The variable Uσ denotes
the first order derivative with respect to σ. The first order condition requires that Uσ = 0
[Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004)]. By assumption, the unconditional expectation of x is
zero, i.e., Ext = 0. For example, E log(zt) = 0 if we assume the standard AR(1) process
as in the literature. It is also true that x = 0. It then follow that EUt = U . As a result,
there is no way to differentiate policies or economies with the same U using the first order
approximation method.
The second order approximation of utility is given by:
EUt = U + 1/2E(xt − x)′Uxx(xt − x) + 1/2Uσσσ2.
The square matrix Uxx denotes the Hessian matrix with respect to x. The variable Uσσ
denotes the second order derivatives of utility with respect to σ. With second order approx-
imation, it is clear that both E(xt − x)′Uxx(xt − x) and Uσσ are not necessarily zero. As
8We briefly show how to solve the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium in the appendix which is
available upon request.
15
a result, the second order approximation allows to evaluate different policies or economies
with the same non-stochastic steady state, in other words, it allows us to obtain the non-zero
welfare cost of the additional volatility of country spread.
4.1 Welfare cost
We focus on the unconditional cost instead of a conditional cost because the ranking of the
conditional cost will depend upon the assumed initial state of the economy [Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2006a,b)]. Volatilities of country spread may be different because some economies
face the possibility of sudden stops while others do not [Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)].
In our numerical exercise, an economy with highly volatile country spread can be regarded
as emerging economies. We set the standard deviation of country spread at 0.0196 [Neumayer
and Perri (2001)], for this type of economy. An economy with less volatile country spread can
be regarded as developed small open economies. The standard deviation of country spread
is set at 0.0096, an artificial number. We assume this smaller number to serve the purpose to
differentiate emerging economies and developed small open economies. Making this artificial
number smaller or larger (as long as it is smaller than 0.0196) does not change the qualitative
results. This is in line with the literature: Mendoza (2001) shows that emerging economies
face a positive probability of sudden stops and have a more volatile country spread.
Given the tariff rate and the joint stochastic process of total factor productivity, world
interest rates, and country spread, the unconditional lifetime welfare, EV , can be written as
EV (τ, σ),
where σ denotes the uncertainty of the economy. The above definition means that the
unconditional lifetime utility is a function of economic uncertainty and the tariff rate.
The cost of volatility is defined as a lump sum consumption, λ(τ, σ), by which the repre-
sentative household is willing to give up to be as well off to avoid uncertainty. This definition
can be regarded as equivalent variation in the sense that the change in consumption is equiv-
alent to economic uncertainty in terms of its welfare impact [Mas-Colell et al. (1995, page
82)]. Mathematically, the welfare cost of volatility is indirectly defined by
EV (τ, σ) =
{
[c(τ)− λ(τ, σ)− h(τ)ω/ω]1−γ − 1} / (1− γ)
1− [1 + c(τ)− λ(τ, σ)− h(τ)ω/ω]−β1 . (4.1)
The non-stochastic steady consumption and hours are functions of τ and EV is a function
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of τ and σ. As a result, the cost is a function of both τ and σ as well. If we remove λ, then
the righthand side of Eq. (4.1) denotes the non-stochastic steady state lifetime welfare of
the representative household at the tariff rate. One thing to note is that we can write down
the cost in Eq. (4.1) without changing hours because with GHH momentum utility function,
there is no wealth effect on the labor supply.
Once we solve the model, we obtain the numerical value for EV (τ, σ), c(τ), and h(τ).
There is only one unknown in Eqs. (4.1), λ(τ, σ). The equation is solved using MATLAB
command, fsolve.m.9 After λ(τ, σ) is obtained, the cost of sudden stops is given by
λ(τ, sudden stops) = λ(τ, σCR = 1.96%)− λ(τ, σCR = 0.96%). (4.2)
The difference is used to denote the cost of sudden stops because we focus on the cost
associated with the additional volatility of country spread due to the possibility of sudden
stops.
4.2 Data and calibration
For the benchmark economy, we select the Argentina economy as a representative because
it is well known that Argentina has suffered a lot from sudden stops. We use three different
data sources. The first one is the International Financial Statistics of International Monetary
Fund, from which we obtain data about GDP, investment (fixed capital formation), total
consumption, exports of goods and services, and imports of goods and services.10 All data
are deseasonalized using the X-12 ARIMA procedure provided by the Bureau of Census and
deflated by the GDP deflator. We apply the HP filter to obtain the cyclical components
of each time series and consequently obtain the standard deviations of output, investment,
trade openness and consumption, and the first order serial autocorrelation of output. They
are listed in Table 3. With the same data source, we set the non-stochastic steady state trade
openness, TO, at 0.31, which is the average of trade openness of Argentina from the first
quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 2009. The non-stochastic steady state trade balance
9Similarly, we use the same command to solve (4.4) to obtain welfare cost in the Cobb-Douglas utility
case.
10Here total consumption is defined in the same way as in Neumayer and Perri (2005): the sum of private
consumption, government spending, change in the inventories, and statistical errors and discrepancy.
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to GDP ratio, stb, is set at 0.025.
11
The second data source is the World Trade Organization from which we obtain the data
on tariff rates that governments actually charge on imports and the value of imports for
products.12 Products are identified by 6-digit codes under the World Customs Organizations
internationally agreed “Harmonized System” for defining product categories. The average
of value-weighted ad valorem tariff rates of Argentina for years 1999-2001 is 14%. Thus, we
set the non-stochastic steady state tariff rate at 14%.
We also rely on the literature to help determine the values of some parameters. For
example, the non-stochastic steady state interest rate, R, is set at 1.0275 [Uribe and Yue
(2006)]. It is consistent with the average 11% annual real interest rate faced by a small open
economy in the international capital market. The non-stochastic steady state world interest
rate Rus is set at 1.01625 [Mendoza and Uribe (2000)]. The non-stochastic steady state of
net foreign debt is given by d = TB/(R − 1), where TB denotes the non-stochastic steady
state trade balance. In addition, the law of motion of interest rate is assumed to follow the
estimated process in Neumeyer and Perri (2001):(
Rˆust
CˆRt
)
=
(
0.73 0.04
0.70 0.58
)(
Rˆust−1
CˆRt−1
)
+
(
εt,Rus
εt,CR
)
, (4.3)
where the variables with hat denote the percentage deviations from the trend. The variance
and covariance of innovations are given by σεRus = 0.42%, σεCR = 1.96%, and ρεR,εCR = 0.30.
We calibrate the economy to match the quarterly data of Argentina. The risk aversion
coefficient, γ, is set at 2, a common value used in the business cycle literature. The capital
depreciation rate, δ, is set at 0.025, which has also been widely used in the literature. The
exponent of labor supply in utility, ω, is set at 1.455 [Mendoza (1991)].13 The share of labor
income in value added, sh, and the share of capital income in value added, sk, are set at 0.62
and 0.38, respectively, [Neumayer and Perri (2005)]. The parameter ϕ in Eq. (2.14) is set
at 1.2 [Uribe and Yue (2006)]. The value means that the representative firm needs to save
money to be able to pay at least 1.2 quarter wage bills.
11Note that several papers set stb = 0.5% for Argentina. The difference is that we use the national accounts
measured in the domestic currency while those papers use data measured in the U.S. dollars. For the same
IMF data source, if we use the data measured in the U.S. dollars, the average of stb is around 0.55%. In
the sensitivity analysis, we show that policy analysis is robust with respect to the values of non-stochastic
steady state trade balance.
12The data are available at www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm.
13As argued in Neumayer and Perri (2005), there is no independent estimate of ω. They set it at 1.6.
18
The parameter αm is chosen to make sure that in the non-stochastic steady state, trade
openness is 31%. The parameters, αk and αh, are determined by two conditions: first, in the
value added, capital income share is sk = 0.38 and labor income share is sh = 0.62; second,
the production is homogeneous of degree one, so αk+αh = 1−αm. The share of investment
in value added, si, is calculated by the following equation:
si =
i
y −m =
δrk
r(y −m) =
δsk
r
.
The non-stochastic steady state rate of return on capital, r, is calculated from the non-
stochastic steady state optimal condition r = R−1+δ. The share of consumption is derived
by using the accounting identity in the non-stochastic steady state, sc = 1− si − stb. From
the calibration so far, the determination of the non-stochastic steady state of c and h is
independent of β1. Thus, the parameter β1 can be calibrated by the following non-stochastic
steady state optimal condition:
1 = (1 + c− hω/ω)−β1 R.
The implied value for β1 is 0.0659, which is less than γ = 2. This guarantees the GHH
utility function is suitable for dynamic programming when we close the debt adjustment
cost channel [Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)].
Once the above structural parameters are calibrated, their values will be kept constant.
One thing worth mentioning is that the non-stochastic steady state trade balance to GDP
share will be changed to accommodate the change of the tariff rate in order to have a
balanced non-stochastic steady state. The values for the structural parameters and some
long-run moments are summarized in Table 1.
The last four parameters are the serial correlation of productivity shock, ρ, the standard
deviation of the innovation to productivity shocks, σz, the capital adjustment cost parameter,
φ, and debt adjustment cost parameter, ψ. To calibrate these parameters, we choose values
for them, simulate the model, and repeat this process until the simulated volatilities of
output, investment, and trade openness, and the first order autocorrelation coefficient of
output match the data as close as possible.
In the numerical analysis, Five different models are considered with GHH preferences.
Model (a) is the benchmark economy. When we drop the working constraint from the
benchmark economy, we get model (b). If the one-period subjective discount factor in
the benchmark economy is fixed, that is model (c). Model (d) is the benchmark economy
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dropping out debt adjustment costs and model (e) is the benchmark model dropping both
debt adjustment costs and the working capital constraint. In Cobb-Douglas preferences
case, we consider two different models: one with a working capital constraint, model (f),
and the other without, model (g). For each model, we re-search for the values of these four
parameters. The calibration is displayed in Table 2.
4.3 Numerical results: Business cycles
The benchmark model - model (a) can explain the business cycles of small open economy
well, as shown by the impulse responses and the second moments. Figure 2 shows the impulse
responses of some key variables to a positive country spread shock. The solid line represents
the economy with a low tariff rate. The dotted line represents the economy with a high
tariff rate. When there is a positive country spread shock, the representative household
borrows less because the cost of borrowing rises, and a sudden stop of the type addressed
in Chari et al. (2005) emerges. With the working capital constraint, the labor demand
decreases even though the labor supply does not move because of the GHH preferences. As
a result, the positive country spread shock decreases both hours and output in equilibrium.
Consumption drops because of the negative welfare effect. Investment drops dramatically
because the opportunity cost of investing is high. Trade balance and current account are
thus improved.
Panel (B) and (C) in Table 3 display some second moments with different models as-
sociated with GHH preferences. The benchmark economy, a model with a 14% tariff rate
and high country spread volatility, replicates the selected business cycle moments of Ar-
gentina economy. In particular, the generated standard deviation of output is 4.17%, only
0.01 percentage points lower than the observed counterpart. The generated relative standard
deviation of investment to that of output is 3.00, only 0.08 percentage points higher than
the observed one. The generated standard deviation of trade openness is 2.45, very close to
that observed in the data. Finally, the generated first order serial autocorrelation coefficient
of output is smaller than the data only by 4 percentage points.
Table 3 also lists the generated second moments of consumption and hours. The gen-
erated ratio of σh/σy, 0.75, seems reasonable compared to 0.57 reported in Neumayer and
Perri (2005), where σh and σy denote the standard deviation of hours and that of output,
respectively. However, the benchmark model produces a very low ratio of σc/σy, where σc
denotes the standard deviation of consumption. In the data, the ratio is 1.36, while the
generated ratio is only 0.80, about 41% lower. This is true with all the models we consider
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in this paper. The reason is the inclusion of the intermediate imported inputs, m, which
allows households smooth consumption. Jahan-Parvar et al. (2009) consider similar models
without m in which consumption is more volatile than output. To reconcile this discrepancy,
we suspect that by fixing the supply of m one-period ahead, as Boldrin et al. (2001) do with
respect to the quantity supplied of hours, the modified model will generate more volatile
consumption. However, given our goal is not to match the moment, we defer that to the
future research.
When τ = 14%, other models are also able to replicate the standard deviations of output
and investment, and the first serial autocorrelation of output. These models, however, fail
to generate the standard deviation of trade openness. The benchmark model turns out to
be the best model in replicating business cycles moments of Argentina economy.
The most noticeable feature of Table 3 is that, for the same calibration and the same
process of driving force, economies less open to trade (when τ = 14%) have more volatile
output than economies which are more open to trade (when τ = 0). To see this, simply
compare models in panel (B) to the corresponding models in panel (C) in the GHH pref-
erences case in Table 3. While our results support the empirical findings in Calvo et al.
(2004), Calvo and Talvi (2005), and Edwards (2004a, 2004b); however, we do not assume
liability-dollarization. This directly follows the intuition we have shown in Section 3.2, even
after we introduce those adjustment costs and productivity shocks. The same pattern can
also be seen from the impulse responses of capital to country spread shocks as shown in Fig.
2.
4.4 Numerical results: Welfare cost
To facilitate the discussion, we start with model (d) and model (e) first, both of which do not
have debt adjustment costs. The difference is that model (d) has a working capital constraint
while model (e) does not. With model (d), the welfare cost of the additional volatility of
country spread is -2.0419e-3 unit of consumption good in the benchmark economy when the
tariff rate is set at 14%, which is about 0.204% of its non-stochastic steady state consumption.
This low value of cost is as expected. With the standard real business cycles models, the
welfare cost measured in percentage of consumption is typically small.
The negative welfare cost implies that risk averse households are willing to pay extra to
be able to live in the more volatile economy. In other words, when country spread becomes
more volatile, households will achieve higher welfare. Since Argentina is a net borrower in
the international capital market, this result is not a surprise given the discussion in Section
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3.3. In models with GHH preferences, there are at least two ways to obtain a positive
welfare cost: if the small open economy is a lender in the international capital market, or
if the ability to borrow and lend is compromised. The first condition is confirmed by extra
numerical exercises whose results are not reported here. The second condition is evident by
the cost associated with model (b) and model (c).
When the tariff rate is set at 0 in model (d), the welfare cost turns out to be -2.8634e-3
unit of consumption good, which becomes smaller than that in the τ = 14% case. Thus, the
cost is lower when the economy is more open, which implies that an open trade policy is
preferred. The same trade policy recommendation is implied in model (e): when τ = 14%,
the welfare cost of the extra volatility of country spread is -2.4921e-3 unit of consumption
good (0.2349% of its non-stochastic state consumption). This is higher than the welfare cost
when τ = 0, which is -3.3563e-3 unit of consumption good.
In the economies considered, an increase in trade openness always means an improvement
in production efficiency as we have shown in Section 3.2. When there are no debt adjustment
costs, there will have no forces against the desire to increase trade openness in order to
improve production efficiency. As a result, an open trade policy is always preferred without
financial frictions. Since both model (d) and model (e) recommend an open trade policy, it
is clear that a working capital constraint is an irrelevant factor with respect to optimal trade
policy here.
Now we turn to models (a) - (c), all of which have debt adjustment costs. With model
(a), the welfare cost is -2.2679e-4 unit of consumption good in the benchmark economy when
τ = 14%. It is smaller than the cost of -1.808e-5 units of consumption good when τ = 0.
To check whether the result is due to the assumed endogenous subjective discount factor
or a working capital constraint, model (b) and model (c) are also considered. The same
pattern shows up in model (b) and (c): the cost is increasing in trade openness. Thus, it
is optimal to have a closed trade policy when there are debt adjustment costs. Since the
result is obtained in all three models, (a), (b), and (c), it is independent of the endogenous
subjective discount factor and the working capital constraint.
The numerical results show when there are debt adjustment costs, it is not optimal to
have free trade. The underlying reason is that households’ ability to smooth consumption
by borrowing and lending is compromised. In our numerical examples, the ability is only
mildly weakened in the τ = 14% case while it is severely weakened in the free trade case.
The different impact of debt adjustment costs on that ability outweighs the desire to open
the trade to improve the production efficiency. The net effect leads to the optimality of a
closed trade policy.
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We further consider different values of key parameters. In particular, we consider the
case when households become more risk averse, i.e., increasing the value of γ from 2 to 5. We
also consider the case when labor supply becomes less sensitive to wage rates, i.e., increasing
the value of ω from 1.455 to 1.6.14 Note that Neumayer and Perri (2005) set γ at 5 and ω at
1.6. The numerical results are displayed in Table 4. Once again, we obtain the same results:
no debt adjustment costs, an open trade policy is preferred; otherwise a closed trade policy
is preferred.15
Given the above numerical results, we conclude that the policy implications are robust.
When there are no debt adjustment costs, the desire to improve production efficient leads to
the optimality of an open trade policy. This is independent of the working capital constraint,
the borrowing and lending position, and the key parameter values. When there are debt
adjustment costs, the ability to smooth consumption is severely weakened in the τ = 0 case
and the induced loss outweighs the improvement from production efficiency, which leads to
the optimality of the closed trade policy. This result is independent of the working capital
constraint and the endogenous subjective discount factor; and it robust to the values of key
parameters.
Next, we check whether the policy recommendations are robust with a more general class
of preferences: Cobb-Douglas utility.
4.5 Numerical Results: Cobb-Douglas preferences
We consider the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U (ct, ht) =
{[
cχ (1− h)1−χ]1−γ − 1} / (1− γ) .
In this case, we set β(ct, ht) ≡ β∗ and thus θt+1/θt = β∗. With Cobb-Douglas utility, the
inclusion of debt adjustment costs assures stationary behavior of state variables [Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)]. With Cobb-Douglas utility, there is wealth effect on labor supply.
14In this case of ω = 1.6, we set β1 = 0.589 to have well-defined non-stochastic steady state.
15In the extra numerical exercises, we find that the borrowing and lending position does not affect the
negative relationship between the cost and trade openness in model (d) and model (e). We extend model
(e) to two sector economies with homogenous capital and heterogenous capital, and obtain the same policy
implication. The results are not reported here but available upon request. In addition, we change the value
of ϕ in models (a), (c), and (d), and consider the case in which φ is set at a very small value as in Neumayer
and Perri (2005) in models (a), (b), (c), our results on policy implication remain.
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Thus, the welfare cost of volatility is defined as
EV (τ, σ) =
{
[c(τ)− λ(τ, σ)]χ
[
1− h(τ)− 1−χ
χ
λ(τ,σ)
w(τ)
]1−χ}1−γ
− 1
1− β∗ , (4.4)
where w(τ) denotes the non-stochastic steady state wage rate. The reason for λ(τ) showing
up twice is because in the non-stochastic steady state, we have
(1− χ) c
χ (1− h) = w.
As a result, when c decreases, h will increase due to the wealth effect. The cost of sudden
stops is also defined by Eq. (4.2).
We calibrate two new parameters, χ, which denotes the consumption share in the utility,
and β∗. For simplicity, we set β∗ = 1/R and follow Neumayer and Perri (2005) by setting
χ at 0.24. The rest model-invariant parameters are set at the same values as in the GHH
preferences case. The model-specific parameters, ρz, σz, φ, and ψ are re-estimated for the
two models we consider, model (f) and model (g). The results are shown in panel (D) and
(E) in Table 3. Once again, the following findings with GHH preferences remain true with
Cobb-Douglas preferences: (1) output is more volatile when the economy is more open, and
(2) the welfare cost of extra volatility of country spread is higher in the τ = 14% case than
the τ = 0 case (when it is costly to adjust foreign debt). These are independent of the
working capital constraint.16
Thus, we show the robustness of the policy recommendation when we focus on the cost
of the extra volatility of country spread. It is worth noting that the analysis in the Cobb-
Douglas preferences case is not complete. This is because the tariff rate has a long-run
effect on the non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility with Cobb-Douglas preferences. In
particular, households’ non-stochastic steady state lifetime utility is maximized when τ is set
at a value less than zero, as shown in Fig. 3. Thus, if we start at τ = 14%, it is automatically
true that free trade policy is preferred when there is no uncertainty. However, to conduct a
complete policy analysis with Cobb-Douglas preferences, it is necessary to introduce other
mechanisms to justify a tariff in the first place. Given that our focus is the welfare cost of
additional volatility, we defer the analysis on the justification of a tariff in a more complicated
economic environment to future research.
16Note that here we cannot drop debt adjustment costs because they are required to assure the stationary
behavior of the economy after we drop the endogenous subjective discount factor assumption.
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5 Time-varying tariff rate policy
So far, we have obtained robust results about optimal trade policy: either stay at τ = 14%
when there are debt adjustment costs; or pursue free trade policy when there are no debt
adjustment costs. One relevant question to ask is can the government do better? In other
words, can the economy gain from some kind of time-varying tariff rate policy over the
constant tariff rate policy of 14%?
To answer this question, we extend models (a), (b), (d), and (e) with τ = 14% and high
volatility of country spread by introducing a time-varying tariff rate policy.17 In particular,
we consider the following time-varying policies:
τˆt = ϑ ∗ yˆt, (5.1)
τˆt = −ϑ ∗ CˆRt, (5.2)
where a variable with hat denotes the percentage deviation from its non-stochastic steady
state. The welfare cost of time-varying tariff rate policy is given by
λ(τt, τ) = λ(τt, σ)− λ(τ, σ),
where λ(τt, σ) and λ(τ, σ) are obtained by solving the corresponding Eq. (4.1). When the
cost is positive, it implies that countercyclical policy is detrimental to welfare compared to
the fixed tariff rate policy. When the cost is negative, it implies that countercyclical policy
is welfare-improving.
We consider both countercyclical policy and procyclical policy. In the numerical exercise,
ϑ varies from −2 to 2. The tariff rate is countercyclical when θ > 0 and procyclical when
θ < 0.18 Countercyclical policy is considered because it is natural for the government
to implement certain countercyclical policy to stabilize the economy. Procyclical policy
is considered because there is bountiful empirical evidence. The most famous example is
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act passed in June of 1930, which increased the tariff rate to 50%.
In the early 1980s, the tariff rate in Chile rose in the face of the debt crisis. After the
December 1994 Peso crisis, the general tariff rate in Mexico rose from 8.7% in 1994 to a peak
17We do not include model (c) with the intention to simplify the computational task.
18Note that the term, procyclical (countercyclical), in this paper means that the tariff rate is high when
output is low (high). Our definition is based on whether the policy tends to stabilize output or not. If yes,
then we say the policy is countercyclical, otherwise procyclical. Sometimes this relationship is labeled as
countercyclical (procyclical) in some literature discussion, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1995).
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of 12.5% in 1995 [Haltiwanger et al. (2004)]. The theoretical explanation provided is that
political factors affect decision makers in such a way that the procyclical trade policy is the
equilibrium outcome [Bagwell and Staiger (1995)].
We plot the welfare cost of countercyclical policy against ϑ in Fig. 4. The first column
shows the welfare costs associated with the policy (5.1). The second column shows the welfare
costs associated with the policy (5.2). Two results immediately show up by examining Fig.
4. First, when there are no debt adjustment costs (the working capital constraint does
not matter), both policies improve the welfare of the economy; see the results associated
with model (d) and model (e). Second, when there are debt adjustment costs, how the
government implements policy matters. In general, the government should set the tariff rate
not as a function of country spread gap, but as a function of output gap. This is a surprising
result. Because both policies (5.1) and (5.2) are countercyclical, therefore we expect both
should increase welfare. Additional numerical exercises show that both results are robust to
different parameter values.
The welfare cost of procyclical policy is plotted against ϑ in Fig. 5. The first and the
second columns show the welfare costs associated with policies (5.1) and (5.2), respectively.
When there are no debt adjustment costs (does not matter whether there is a working capital
constraint), both policies reduce the welfare of the economy; see the results associated with
model (d) and model (e). On the contrary, when there are debt adjustment costs, if the
government sets tariff rates as a function of country spread gap, the economy will gain over
the constant tariff rate policy. This may provide an economic justification why we observe
procyclical tariff rate policy in the real life: because it is not free to adjust foreign debt.
6 Conclusions
We analyze the optimal trade policy when external shocks become more volatile. There
are two opposing forces in the economy. One force is the desire to improve production
efficiency. This leads to the optimality of an open trade policy. The second force is the
debt adjustment costs, which compromises the households’ ability to smooth consumption
through the international capital market. In the models considered, this force dominates and
leads to the optimality of a closed trade policy. In addition, countercyclical policy will be
preferred if there is no financial friction. However, once the economy faces costs in adjusting
its foreign debt, the nature of the policy, countercyclical or procyclical, and the way how the
government implements the policy make a substantial difference. In general, it is optimal to
have tariff rates either to positively respond to output gap, or to negatively respond to the
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country spread gap.
These findings are new theoretical results to the literature. They not only provide robust
policy recommendations, but also provide economic explanations, without considering polit-
ical factors, for two widely observed phenomena: why tariff rates are on average positive and
why procyclical policy is implemented in real life. One simple reason is that it is not free
to adjust foreign debt. The results show that it is important for the government to consider
the costs they face in the international capital market before it considers changes to its trade
policy.
Given the fact that those economies with a positive possibility of sudden stops usually
face debt adjustment costs, it is thus recommended, according to our theoretical results,
that they adopt a closed trade policy, even though this case may lead to greater economic
volatility. Thus, even with the findings in Calvo et al. (2004) and Calvo and Talvi (2005), it
is still optimal to close the door. Further, our results show that the government needs to pay
attention to the anchor to which tariff rates should respond when it adopts a time-varying
tariff rate policy.
Barro (2009) claims if a model does not satisfy the “Atkeson-Phelan principle”, the
welfare analysis based on the model is less meaningful. To satisfy the “Atkeson-Phelan
principle,” it is necessary for the model to have a good explanation power of the equity
prices in emerging economies. Jahan-Parvar et al. (2009) show that debt adjustment costs
do make a difference in explaining the equity returns in emerging economies. This paper
illustrates and confirms the claim in Barro (2009) by showing the difference in optimal trade
policy due to debt adjustment costs.
There is, however, scope for improvement in our analysis. For example, in the Cobb-
Douglas preferences case, we impose a tariff without an economic reason. To justify the use
of the tariff rate, it is sufficient to consider some market failures or externalities. We defer
this to future research.
We also assume a reduced form representation of sudden stops simply due to the com-
putational technique concern. The perturbation method we use requires no kinks in policy
functions. However, to endogenize sudden stops, it is necessary to introduce kinks to policy
functions. Some new algorithm with the penalty function analyzed in den Haan and de
Wind (2008) may help solve models with endogenized sudden stops. However, we suspect
that our long-run results would be reversed because sudden stops are rare events.
In addition, some business cycle moments generated by our three-input models are quite
different from those corresponding moments generated by two-input models. For example,
consumption is volatile than output in Neumayer and Perri (2005). However, it is more
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smoother than output in our model (c), which is a three-input counterpart of the two-
input model in Neumayer and Perri (2005). Some factor inflexibility may help reconcile the
difference.
At last, we only consider three types of shocks. Recently, the literature has argued that
investment-specific shocks are an important driving force of business cycles. Generalizing
the model to allow for investment-specific shocks (and other shocks, such as government
expenditure shocks) is an additional extension we plan to consider in later work.
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7 Tables and figures
Table 1: Calibration
Symbol Definition Value
γ Risk aversion coefficient 2
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025
ω Exponent of labor supply in utility 1.5
ϕ Working capital constraint parameter 1.2
αm Imported input elasticity 0.1422
αh Labor elasticity 0.5318
αk Capital elasticity 0.3260
β1 Subjective discount factor parameter 0.0659
si Investment share in value added 0.1773
sc Consumption share in value added 0.7977
sh Share of labor income in value added 0.62
sk Share of capital income in value added 0.38
stb Share of trade balance in value added 0.025
RUS Steady state of world interest rate 1.01625
R Steady state of interest rate 1.0275
TO Steady state of trade openness 0.31
r Marginal return to capital 0.0525
τ Average tariff rate 0.14
Notes: Table 1 contains the calibration of structural parameters that are invariant to models for the Ar-
gentina economy.
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Table 2: Calibration of Model Specific Structural Parameters
Models ρz σz φ ψ ϕ
(A) GHH
(a) Benchmark 0.66 1.25e-2 0.70 0.005 1.2
(b) Without WK 0.68 1.25e-e 0.45 0.005 0
(c) With constant β 0.70 1.20e-2 0.60 0.10 1.2
(d) Without B/L 0.64 1.20e-2 1.20 0 1.2
(e) Without (WK and B/L) 0.67 1.20e-2 1.20 0 0
(B) Cobb-Douglas
(f) Benchmark 0.72 1.50e-2 5.5 0.05 1.2
(g) Without WK 0.67 1.60e-2 5.0 0.05 0
Notes: Table 2 contains the calibration of structural parameters that are model specific for the Argentina
economy. Reported values are calibrated model specific parameters in this study. ρz and σz are, respectively,
the first order autoregressive parameter and the standard deviation of the productivity process. φ and ψ are,
respectively, the cost parameters for capital adjustment costs and borrowing and lending costs. When φ = 0,
the capital adjustment costs are dropped in the model. When ψ = 0, the borrowing and lending costs are
dropped in the model. ϕ is the working capital constraint parameter. When ϕ > 0, a working capital constraint
is introduced into the model. When ϕ = 0, the working capital constraint is dropped. “WK” refers to the model
with the imposition of the working-capital constraint. “B/L” denotes debt adjustment costs.
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Figure 1: Steady state with GHH utility
0 0.5 1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Trade Openness
0 0.5 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Hours
0 0.5 1
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Capital
0 0.5 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Intermediate Inputs
0 0.5 1
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Consumption
0 0.5 1
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
Trade Balance
0 0.5 1
−2
−1
0
1
Debt Position
0 0.5 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Investment
Tariff
0 0.5 1
−12.3469
−12.3469
−12.3469
−12.3469
Utility
Notes: The vertical axis variables represent the aggregate variables of interest. The horizontal variable denotes
the tariff rate. The model is the benchmark economy.
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Table 3: Business Cycle Moments and Welfare Cost
Business Cycle Moments Welfare
Data & Models Of interest Implied Cost
σy
σi
σy
σTO ρy
σc
σy
σh
σy
(10e-4)
(A) Data 4.18 2.92 2.44 0.82 1.36 – –
(B) GHH with τ = 14%
(a) Benchmark 4.17 3.00 2.45 0.78 0.80 0.75 -2.2679
(b) Without WK 4.21 2.88 1.83 0.79 0.80 0.69 -1.0426
(c) With constant β 4.16 2.92 1.82 0.81 0.63 0.68 0.010
(d) Without B/L 4.25 2.84 3.43 0.81 0.73 0.75 -20.419
(e) Without (WK and B/L) 4.18 2.92 3.37 0.79 0.72 0.69 -24.921
(C) GHH with τ = 0%
(a) Benchmark 4.15 2.35 1.20 0.78 0.82 0.73 -0.1808
(b) Without WK 3.70 1.41 1.24 0.79 0.58 0.69 0.0054
(c) With constant β 4.06 2.71 1.73 0.80 0.63 0.68 0.052
(d) Without B/L 4.13 2.66 3.15 0.80 0.84 0.75 -28.634
(e) Without (WK and B/L) 4.08 2.72 3.13 0.78 0.82 0.69 -33.563
(D) Cobb-Douglas with τ = 14%
(f) Benchmark 4.22 2.93 3.05 0.76 0.69 0.43 0.066
(g) Without WK 4.19 2.92 3.16 0.67 0.66 0.45 0.049
(E) Cobb-Douglas with τ = 0%
(f) Benchmark 4.08 2.81 2.87 0.75 0.71 0.42 0.068
(g) Without WK 4.06 2.80 2.97 0.66 0.68 0.44 0.052
Notes: The moments are calculated based on the standard deviation of country spread shocks being 1.96%.
The cost of extra volatility of country spread is defined by Eq. (4.2). All values of standard deviations are in
percentages. σy , σi, σTO, σc, and σh are, respectively, the standard deviations of output, investment, trade
openness, consumption and hours, and ρy denotes the first order serial autocorrelation of output. The welfare
costs are measured in units of consumption good. “Data” report the unconditional sample moments. We do
not report the data of σh because in general the quality of data for emerging economies is poor; see Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007). Neumeyer and Perri (2005) report a value of 0.57 for σh/σy. “WK” refers to the model with
the imposition of the working-capital constraint. “B/L” denotes debt adjustment costs.
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis – Welfare Cost
Different Combinations of key parameters
γ = 2 γ = 2 γ = 5 γ = 5
ω = 1.455 ω = 1.6 ω = 1.455 ω = 1.6
(B) GHH with τ = 14%
(a) Benchmark -2.2679 -2.4701 -1.9306 -2.0940
(b) Without WK -1.0426 -1.4966 -1.0368 -1.4181
(c) With constant β 0.0100 0.0516 0.0265 0.0516
(d) Without B/L -20.419 -23.376 -23.745 -26.636
(e) Without (WK and B/L) -24.921 -26.919 -33.416 -34.198
(C) GHH with τ = 0%
(a) Benchmark -0.1808 -0.3288 -0.1788 -0.3435
(b) Without WK 0.0054 0.0104 0.0028 0.0099
(c) With constant β 0.0518 0.0845 0.0483 0.0677
(d) Without B/L -28.634 -30.571 -41.633 -42.181
(e) Without (WK and B/L) -33.563 -34.331 -52.823 -50.579
Notes: The cost of extra volatility of country spread is defined by Eq. (4.2) and measured in 10e-4 unit of
consumption good. “WK” refers to the model with the imposition of the working-capital constraint. “B/L”
denotes debt adjustment costs. When the exponent of labor supply in utility, ω, is set at 1.6, the subjective
discount factor parameter, β1, will be re-calibrated at 0.0589.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a positive country spread shock
0 5 10 15 20
−3
−2
−1
0
Consumption
0 5 10 15 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Labor
0 5 10 15 20
−1
−0.8
−0.6
Output
0 5 10 15 20
−20
−10
0
10
Investment
0 5 10 15 20
−1
−0.8
−0.6
Imports of M
0 5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
4
Trade Balance Ratio
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Trade Balance
0 5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
4
Current Account Ratio
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
Interest Rate
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Country Spread
0 5 10 15 20
−3
−2
−1
0
Debt Position
0 5 10 15 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Capital
Notes: The benchmark model is the one-sector economy with capital adjustment costs, the working capital, and
debt adjustment costs. The solid line corresponds to 0% tariff rate. The dotted Line corresponds to 14% tariff
rate.
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Figure 3: Steady state with Cobb-Douglas utility
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Notes: The vertical axis variables represent the aggregate variables of interest. The horizontal variable denotes
the tariff rate.
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Figure 4: Welfare cost of countercyclical policies with GHH preferences
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Notes: The vertical axis represents the welfare cost of countercyclical tariff rate around τ = 14% compared to
the fixed tariff rate policy at τ = 14%. The horizontal variable denotes the response coefficient of tariff rates to
the gap of x, where x denotes output in the first column, and country spread in the second column.
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Figure 5: Welfare cost of procyclical policies with GHH preferences
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Notes: The vertical axis represents the welfare cost of procyclical tariff rate around τ = 14% compared to the
fixed tariff rate policy at τ = 14%. The horizontal variable denotes the response coefficient of tariff rates to the
gap of x, where x denotes output in the first column, and country spread in the second column.
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